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Ambition and ambition raising are key concepts 
of the Paris Agreement (PA): Article 3 of the 
agreement, for instance, requires Parties “to 
undertake and communicate ambitious efforts” 
which “will represent a progression over time” 
(Art. 3, Paris Agreement). These provisions must 
be seen in light of the fact that Parties in Paris 
have acknowledged that the intended national-
ly determined contributions (NDC) are insuffi-
cient and that “much greater emission reduc-
tion efforts will be required” (Decision 1/CP.21
para 17).
Despite ambition raising being a pivotal ele-
ment of the new global climate regime, a clear 
definition of the concept is missing. This policy 
paper aims at filling this void. By building on
key provisions of the Paris Agreement, a prelim-
inary definition of ambition raising is elaborat-
ed which puts the intensification of climate 
change mitigation targets and actions by Par-
ties at its centre. Instead of exclusively focusing 
on the integration of emissions in Parties’ (not 
legally binding) NDCs, this definition also con-
siders ambition raising actions with an immedi-
ate climate impact. Building on this conceptual
clarification, the paper further delimits ambi-
tion raising from other related concepts such as 
“contribution to overall mitigation”.
The paper then takes a closer look at how mar-
ket-based cooperation under Article 6 of the 
Paris Agreement could allow for a higher ambi-
tion in Parties’ mitigation actions. By looking at 
five different forms of market-based coopera-
tion, the paper identifies a total of eight ambi-
tion raising options, which come in at different 
stages of the cooperation processes. 
The subsequent analysis shows that the ambi-
tion raising options identified are associated 
with different technical, institutional and politi-
cal challenges. In general, options that are lim-
ited to using a certain share of ITMOs for ambi-
tion raising, as well as those that use account-
ing to over-adjust the emissions or target level 
or that lead to an ex-ante improvement of the 
NDC are technically less complex and do also 
require limited additional institutional capaci-
ties. They do therefore hold the largest poten-
tial for being applied by Parties.  
At the same time, applicability of the different
ambition raising options varies: while some op-
tions can be applied across all different forms of 
cooperation and by all Parties involved, others 
are limited to the role of the transferring Party 
in one specific type of cooperation. In light of 
the fact that Article 6.1 of the PA requires all 
Parties pursuing voluntary cooperation to raise 
their ambition, a combination of the different 
ambition raising options identified will be
needed to meet this requirement. Combining 
the different options further allows to achieve 
the dual objective of having an immediate cli-
mate impact and integrating the increased am-
bition into Parties’ mid and long-term mitiga-
tion strategies. 
The findings indicate that a menu approach 
would be best suited to induce a Party-driven 
process for ambition raising. Instead of the UN-
FCCC defining one-size-fits-all provisions, such 
a menu approach would allow Parties to choose 
the approach that best suits their national cir-
cumstances and the design of the respective 
cooperation. The menu approach would still al-
low the UNFCCC to carefully fine-tune the am-
bition raising requirements to best serve the 
overall goal of the Paris Agreement. Such an 
approach could promote country ownership 
and maintain the bottom-up spirit of the Paris 
Agreement while at the same time maximizing 
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1 Introduction
In Paris, the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) noted with “concern” that Parties in-
tended nationally determined contributions 
(NDC) do not fall within least-cost two degrees 
Celsius scenarios and that “much greater emis-
sion reduction efforts will be required” (Deci-
sion 1/CP.21 para 17). In other words: Parties 
must significantly raise their ambition.
Despite the fact that ambition and ambition 
raising being key concepts of the Paris Agree-
ment, a clear definition of these concepts is
missing. This policy paper aims at filling this
void by first providing a conceptual clarification 
of what ambition and ambition raising is: The 
concept will be explored by building on the 
provisions contained in the Paris Agreement in
order to derive a definition that is close to this
very basic document of the new global climate 
regime. In light of the fact that the Paris Agree-
ment contains other concepts which are closely 
related to the issue of ambition raising, the pa-
per will then delimit these different concepts. 
On the basis of this conceptual exploration, the 
paper then takes a closer look at market-based 
cooperation under the Paris Agreement. Article 
6.2 of the agreement allows internationally 
transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) to be 
transferred among Parties which can be used 
by the acquiring Party for attainment of its na-
tionally determined contribution. Notably, and 
in stark contrast to the role of market-based 
mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris 
Agreement has established a provision in Arti-
cle 6.1 that requires that the “cooperation in the 
implementation of [Parties’] nationally deter-
mined contributions [are] to allow for higher 
ambition in their mitigation and adaptation ac-
tions“ (Article 6.1 Paris Agreement). While this 
provision reflects the widely shared argument 
that market-based mechanisms have the po-
tential to induce a raise in climate change miti-
gation ambition, operationalisation of how 
market-based mechanisms may contribute to 
ambition raising is still lacking. This policy paper 
aims at contributing to this debate by present-
ing a wide range of options of how Parties in-
volved in cooperative approaches can increase 
their climate change mitigation ambition. Sec-
tion three presents these eight different ambi-
tion raising options by first showing how the 
different ambition raising options relate to the 
individual phases of a market-based coopera-
tion process. After having presented the com-
patibility of the ambition raising options with
the different types of cooperation and the roles 
Parties have therein, the chapter presents the 
options in detail.
In section four, the ambition raising options are 
assessed from a technical, institutional and le-
gal/political perspective. While the technical as-
sessment relates to the options’ requirements 
in terms of data availability and methodological 
complexity, the institutional assessment focus-
es on the question of whether existing institu-
tions could be used for its operationalisation. In
the legal/political assessment, the compatibility 
of ambition raising options with the overarch-
ing legal framework of the UNFCCC and the po-
tential challenges are explored.
The findings of this analysis are then discussed 
and put into the larger context of the Paris 
Agreement’s structure and the current negotia-
tions dynamic. On that basis, recommendations 
are derived that suggest an approach which al-
lows Parties to maximize their ambition 




















2.1 Ambition in the Paris 
Agreement 
Ambition and ambition raising are arguably key 
concepts of the Paris Agreement. However,
clear definitions of ambition and ambition rais-
ing are lacking. Most people think of ambition 
as a “desire to achieve a particular end” (Merri-
am-Webster 2017). In global climate policy,
ambition is usually meant to judge the extent 
to which a Party (or the global community) is
committed to act on climate change. While the 
term ambition is also used to describe the will-
ingness to implement adaptation activities,
ambition is mostly being used in the mitigation 
context. The latter is also the focus of this pa-
per: ambition and ambition raising in the con-
text of climate change mitigation. To clarify the 
concepts of ambition and ambition raising, the 
paper will first look at the respective sections of
the Paris Agreement in more detail. In the 
agreement, the term ambition is used five 
times. 
Article 3 states that “[a|s nationally determined 
contributions to the global response to climate 
change, all Parties are to undertake and com-
municate ambitious efforts…” and that these 
efforts “will represent a progression over time” 
(Art. 3, Paris Agreement). By the same token, Ar-
ticle 4.3 requires that the NDCs represent a 
“progression beyond the Party’s then current 
nationally determined contribution and reflect 
its highest possible ambition“ (Art. 4.3), while
Article 4.11 allows Parties to adjust their NDCs 
at any time “with a view to enhancing its level 
of ambition“ (Art. 4.11). Hence, in all three of 
these Articles ambition is related to Parties’ 
NDCs.
In Article 4.5, in contrast, the concept is ex-
panded to actions, by stating that „enhanced 
support for developing country Parties will al-
low for higher ambition in their actions“ (Art. 
4.5). This broader concept is also used in Article 
6.1, which states that the voluntary cooperation 
among Parties is “to allow for higher ambition 
in their mitigation and adaptation actions”(Art.
6.1), while Article 6.8 speaks more generally 
about the goal “to promote mitigation and ad-
aptation ambition” (Art. 6.8). These statements 
allow to draw some first conclusions about how 
the concept of ambition is used under the Paris 
Agreement.
First, ambition is related to targets and actions.
While some Articles of the PA make reference to 
the ambition of NDCs, others link the concept 
more broadly to Parties’ actions.1 Hence, while 
ambition cannot be observed or assessed di-
rectly, targets and actions can be an expression 
of high (or low) ambition. This broader concep-
tualisation somewhat deviates from the inter-
national debate, where ambition is often exclu-
sively associated to the target level of Parties’ 
NDCs. Exclusively linking ambition raising to 
the NDCs target level might originate from the 
sense that including the raise of ambition with-
in the  NDC will provide more safety in terms of
actually achieving the final objective. While the 
 
1 Please note that NDCs may not only include targets. Art. 
4.6 of the Paris Agreement, for instance, allows least de-
veloped countries and small island developing states to 
“prepare and communicate strategies, plans and actions”
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role of NDCs as the key point of reference in the 
Paris regime cannot be questioned, it should be 
taken into account that there is no legal obliga-
tion for Parties to actually achieve their NDC. 
With NDCs lacking legal bindingness, climate 
change mitigation actions gain considerable
relevance as an indicator of ambition raises.
Linking ambition with targets and actions is al-
so consistent with the conventional use of am-
bition, understood as a desire to achieve a par-
ticular end. Here, actions would indicate 
whether the desire to achieve a particular over-
arching end is strong or not.
Second, ambition can be influenced by external
circumstances. In this case, the understanding 
of ambition in the climate policy realm differs 
somewhat from the colloquial usage, where 
ambition as a desire to achieve a particular end 
cannot necessarily be influenced by the means 
to achieve this end. 
Third, the word “higher” in the statement of Ar-
ticle 4.5 indicates that ambition can be com-
pared. Notably, however, it does neither indi-
cate to what it should be compared nor by 
what level it should be increased. 
2.2 Ambition raising in Article 6 
This brings us directly to the concept of ambi-
tion raising, which has a temporal/dynamic
component and implies that Parties’ mitigation 
targets and actions are intensified. Ambition
raising is also relevant in the context of the use 
of the cooperation mechanisms of Article 6. Ar-
ticle 6.2 of the Paris Agreement allows Parties to 
cooperate in implementing their NDCs, inter 
alia by exchanging internationally transferrable 
mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) and using them 
towards their NDCs2. 
 
2 Unless otherwise noted, the term NDC is used to refer to 
the unconditional elements of the NDC. 
This is largely similar to the basic principle 
known from the Kyoto Protocol (KP), where the 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and 
Joint Implementation (JI) allowed industrialised
countries to use emission reductions generated 
elsewhere for attaining their mitigation targets 
adopted under the KP. In contrast to the so-
called flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Proto-
col, however, Article 6.1 requires activities to 
“allow for higher ambition in [Parties’] mitiga-
tion […] actions” (Art. 6.1, emphasis added). A 
final decision about the scope of this provision 
will be taken by the Conference of the Parties 
serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Par-
is Agreement (CMA) as part of the Paris rule 
book to be adopted by the end of 2018, at the 
earliest. In the meantime, the fact that ambi-
tion and progression over time are strongly 
embedded in the Paris Agreement makes ambi-
tion raising a key requirement for all types of 
cooperation taking place under Article 6.
Furthermore, the formulation in Article 6.1 
clearly links the use of cooperation mechanisms 
to individual Parties’ ambition. With this, ambi-
tion raising is linked to the mitigation targets 
and actions of individual Parties.
Another notable aspect is that Article 6.1  can 
be read as a requirement that does not foresee 
any differentiation between the Parties in-
volved, as it reads: “Parties recognize that some
Parties choose to pursue voluntary cooperation 
in the implementation of their nationally de-
termined contributions to allow for higher am-
bition...“ (Art. 6.1, emphasis added). The word
“their” suggests that voluntary cooperation is to 
allow for higher ambition of all Parties involved 



























































Note: Emissions level is not the NDC 




Figure 1: Cooperative approaches as a tool to enhance a Party’s mitigation ambition. Source Wuppertal Institute
Figure 2 illustrates the understanding of ambi-
tion and ambition raising that underpins this
paper: at the centre of the figure is the blue ar-
row which describes the country’s ambition. It 
consists of mitigation targets and actions. As 
can be seen from the orange and green boxes 
and arrows, the country’s targets and actions 
(and hence its ambition) are dependent on 
domestic as well as international condi-
tions. 3 The country in this figure starts from
emissions level A and adopts mitigation targets 
and implements mitigation actions in order to 
achieve its ambition level B. However, thanks to 
the use of cooperative approaches under the 
Paris Agreement, the country will be able to
enhance its ambition, allowing it to reduce its 
 
3 Note that some of these conditions might also be influ-
enced by the country’s ambition level, influence might 
therefore be reciprocal. 
emissions to level C. If ambition is further in-
creased, the country might even be able to 
achieve emissions level D.
2.3 Putting ambition raising in-
to context    
Ambition raising cannot be understood without
the broader context of other concepts which 
describe positive, neutral or negative impacts 
on the climate. These different concepts can be 
seen in a continuum: The first describes a nega-
tive outcome: The undermining of environ-
mental integrity. The term “environmental in-
tegrity” describes “a situation where the 
individual elements or mechanisms of an over-
arching instrument do not undermine the (en-
vironmental) goals of this instrument” (Kreibich
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Figure 2: Illustration of key differences between ambition raising and other related concepts. Source: Wuppertal Institute
For the specific case of emissions trading, for 
example, this means that environmental integ-
rity is undermined if transfers of ITMOs lead to 
global emission levels that are higher than 
those of a situation without these transfers tak-
ing place. Environmental integrity can be un-
dermined in many ways.  For instance, if mitiga-
tion activities that would have been 
implemented anyway are used for the genera-
tion of credits and used for NDC achievement 
(for an overview see: Kreibich and Hermwille 
2016). In this regard, some of the proposals
made in the debate about ambition raising,
such as limiting carry-over of mitigation out-
comes from one NDC period to the next, be-
come relevant. These proposals are aimed at 
safeguarding a certain ambition level to ad-
dress the risk of environmental integrity being 
undermined. They are, however, not directly re-
lated to the question of ambition raising.
In order to allow Article 6 activities to result in
ambition raising, ensuring environmental in-
tegrity can be considered a basic prerequisite.
From the author’s point of view, environmental 
integrity is ensured if international transfers of
mitigation outcomes are at least a “zero-sum
game”. Hence, a situation in which a globally
neutral balance in terms of greenhouse gas 
(GHG) additions and subtractions to the atmos-
phere is achieved. The term zero-sum game
denotes a scenario in which mitigation out-
comes have been generated by additional miti-
gation activities and are entirely used for NDC
attainment (for an analysis on the issue of addi-
tionality see: Hermwille and Obergassel 2018). 
Ambition raising, in contrast, must go beyond 
that situation by allowing Parties to adopt miti-
gation targets and implement respective miti-
gation actions that result in a lower national
emissions level.  
Ambition raising can further be discerned from 
the concept of overall mitigation in global
emissions. Here, actorness becomes key: it is 
the international community and not individual
Parties that take action to generate a climate 
benefit. The mitigation outcomes are no longer 
linked to the Parties involved and the Parties’
ambition level stays the same.  
The Paris Agreement’s provisions on Article 6 
can again be a guiding document for this dif-
ferentiation: As outlined above, Article 6.1,
which serves as a chapeau for all other para-
graphs of Article 6, requires cooperation activi-
ties to allow for a higher ambition in the mitiga-


















involved. This requirement is also valid for Arti-
cle 6.4, which establishes a new “mechanism to 
contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas 
emissions and support sustainable develop-
ment”. This new mechanism, however, shall fur-
ther “deliver an overall mitigation in global 
emissions” (Art. 6.4 d). This clearly shows that 
ambition raising and contribution to overall
mitigation are two concepts that must not be 
confounded. While all activities under Article 6 
must contribute to a raise of ambition of the 
Parties involved, only the mechanism enshrined 
in Article 6.4 additionally requires a contribu-
tion to overall mitigation. 
The difference can be illustrated by using the 
example of cancellation of units: If an acquiring 
Party voluntarily decides to cancel a certain 
share of the ITMOs imported without these be-
ing used by another Party, this can be consid-
ered a raise of the Party’s mitigation ambition.
If, by contrast, the mechanism under Article 6.4 
(Sustainable Development Mechanism) estab-
lishes provisions or a procedure that result in
the automatic cancellation of ITMOs, these can 
be considered a contribution to global mitiga-
tion. While in the context of ambition raising,
there is a clear link between the ITMOs and the 
country that decided to cancel these ITMOs,
such a connection is missing in the case ITMOs 
have been cancelled by an independent third 
actor, such as the UNFCCC.
Figure 2 illustrates key differences of the con-
cepts discussed with regard to their climate im-
pact and the role of Parties involved in the 
ITMO transfer.  
2.4     The NDC cycle as an over-
arching framework for ambi-
tion raising 
At the core of Paris Agreement’s structure to 
induce a raise of ambition lies the NDC cycle:
Article 4.9 requires Parties to update their NDC 
every five years. Notably, successive NDCs must 
represent a progression beyond current NDC 
and reflect the highest possible level of ambi-
tion (Art. 4.3) (see Box 1). 
The updating of NDCs is to be informed by oth-
er processes, one of it being the global stock-
take: here, the CMA assesses the collective pro-
gress towards achieving the Paris Agreements 
long-term goals in regular periods of five years.  
NDCs as a key element of ambition raising
Under the Paris Agreement, each Party is required to “prepare, 
communicate and maintain successive Nationally Determined 
Contributions that it intends to achieve” (Art 4.2. NDCs can 
vary significantly in form and content. The following are key 
parameters describing a greenhouse gas-based NDC.: 
• The timeframe is the period in which the NDC is to be 
achieved. It can be a single year or multiple years (anoth-
er possibility is peak and decline). 
• The sectoral scope defines the sectors covered by the 
NDC (if not covered by the NDC, additional information 
on the treatment of the land sector might be required) 
• The coverage of GHGs defines which greenhouse gases 
are targeted by the contribution. 
• The geographic scope defines the area covered. 
The expected impact of the NDC will primarily be defined by 
the following two parameters: .  
• The reference level relates to the quantity of emissions 
against which the NDC is compared. The choice of the 
reference level depends on the contribution type and 
can be base year emissions, base year emissions intensity 
or baseline scenario emissions. 
• The target level of the NDC describes the reduction of 
emissions the Party is to achieve. 
Conditionality of NDCs: In the run-up to the Paris Confer-
ence, Parties at COP20 in Lima were unable to agree on the 
information to be provided when submitting their NDCs (Ott 
et al. 2015). Hence, almost 80% of all Parties have included 
conditional elements in their NDC. While 43% have combined 
it with an unconditional con tribution, 33% have adopted a 
conditional contribution only (Day, Röser, and Kurdziel 2016).  
While unconditional elements indicates a Party`s intention to 
implement these activities unilaterally, a conditional target 
implies Party’s willingness to adopt a more stringent mitiga-
tion target or additional actions under certain conditions. 
While these conditions are generally associated to increased 
financial and technical support, there is no clear definition of 
what these conditions may comprise in detail. In addition, 
conditional elements have been expressed in different forms 
and with varying degrees of transparency. In addition to these 
problems of lack of detail and clar ity, it will be challenging at 
the practical level to separate unilateral from funded mitiga-
tion activities (Day, Röser, and Kurdziel 2016). 
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A decisive element is the enhanced transparen-
cy framework for action and support (Art. 13):
The transparency framework requires Parties to 
submit relevant information to inter alia track 
their progress towards achieving their NDCs. 
The data submitted by Parties undergoes a 
technical expert review which is also to identify 
areas of improvement for Parties. Furthermore, 
the update of Parties’ NDCs is to be informed by 
the global stocktake of Article 14. While the fo-
cus of the global stocktake is on assessing the 
global progress towards meeting the goals of 
the Paris Agreement indicating a aggregate as-
sessment, this process may also include dis-
aggregated components (Holz and Ngwadla 
2016).
The mechanism to facilitate the implementa-
tion of and promote compliance with Paris 
Agreement established by Art. 15.1 can also be 
considered an instrument to inform the NDC
updating processes. The mechanism consists of 
an expert-based committee that is to be facilita-
tive in nature and function in a non-punitive 
manner.
Together, these elements are to induce an en-
hancement of mitigation ambition both with 
regard to the level of Parties’ NDCs as well as 
with regard to the action taken by Parties to 
reach their current NDCs.  In addition, the Paris 
Agreement allows countries to adjust the NDC 
at anytime to increase the level of ambition 
(Art. 4.11).
2.5 What is to be raised? 
One key question when talking about ambition 
raising is: What should actually be made more 
ambitious? Following the theoretical explora-
tions made above, a clear answer to this can be 
provided: Ambition is raised when Parties’
mitigation targets and/or actions are intensi-
fied. Instead of fully relying on the later inte-
gration of more stringent mitigation targets in-
to Parties’ NDCs, this definition encompasses 
both: actions on the ground as well as mitiga-
tion plans that are at a later point to be trans-
lated into concrete actions, such as the mitiga-
tion targets contained in countries’ NDCs.
2.6 What types of market-based 
cooperation may be used 
for ambition raising?  
Article 6 of the Paris Agreement allows for dif-
ferent types of market-based cooperation that 
could potentially be used for ambition raising.
Depending on the type of cooperation, differ-
ent options to raise ambition may be possible.
The section will first briefly outline the different
types of market-based cooperation and then 
present options how these could be used for 
ambition raising. It should be noted that for the 
sake of simplicity, the flow of ITMOs in the types 
of cooperation presented here only flows in
one direction, from the transferring country to 
the acquiring country. In practice, however, 
ITMOs might also flow in both directions and 
the different types of cooperation might even 
be combined. If ITMOs are to be used for NDC
attainment, Parties involved must implement 
corresponding adjustment in order to account 
for these transfers (see Fehler! Verweisquelle 
konnte nicht gefunden werden. below).
Government-to-government transfers 
This type of cooperation is the most direct one:
the government of the acquiring Party provides 
funds to a transferring Party in exchange of 
ITMOs. In most cases, these ITMOs will be used
for the achievement of the acquiring Party’s
NDC. However, other applications are also pos-
sible; for instance, the acquiring Party might 



















Another form of cooperation is (full or partial) 
linking of national climate policies, such as 
emissions trading systems. In this scenario, the 
national policy instrument of the transferring 
Party is linked to that of the acquiring Party. En-
tities (companies, installations) covered by the 
national climate policy in the acquiring Party 
can use emission reductions generated through 
the climate policy in the transferring Party in 
exchange of financial means. The policy of the 
transferring Party contributes to achieving the 
NDC of the acquiring Party.
Policy crediting
A third form of international cooperation is pol-
icy crediting: Country B assists country A in im-
plementing a national climate policy instru-
ment by providing financial support. In
exchange of that support, country B receives (a 
part of) the emission reductions achieved by 
the national climate policy of country A. While
similar to government-to-government transfers, 
the emission reductions and the funds trans-
ferred are contingent on the results of the spe-
cific policy (results-based payments). 
Sectoral crediting 
Another option is sectoral crediting: The trans-
ferring Party establishes a crediting baseline for 
a specific sector. If emissions in this sector fall 
below the baseline, the Party can export these 
in form of ITMOs to the acquiring country, who 
provides the transferring Party with financial
means in return. 
Activity-based crediting 
Another form of international cooperation con-
sists of the acquiring Party implementing or fi-
nancing an emission reduction activity (project,
programme) in the transferring Party in ex-
change of (a share of) the emission reductions 
generated by the activity. In contrast to policy 
crediting, this type of cooperation does not ac-
tively involve the government of the acquiring 
Party but only requires the transferring Party’s 
government to authorize the implementation 
of the activity.
2.7 Accounting for ITMO trans-
fers through corresponding 
adjustments 
One concern with the different forms of ITMO
transfers described above is that the underlying 
emission reductions are counted more than 
once. This is the case, for instance, if one emis-
sion reduction reduces the inventory emissions 
of the transferring country while at the same
time being used for NDC achievement of the 
acquiring country. In order to avoid this and 
similar situations known as double counting,
Parties in Paris have agreed that Parties are to 
implement “corresponding adjustments (..) for 
both anthropogenic emissions by sources and 
removals by sinks covered by their nationally 
determined contributions” (Decision 1/CP.21 
para 36). Corresponding adjustments will be 
part of the overall accounting system. “Ac-
counting” refers to the set of systems and pro-
cesses needed for comparing Parties’ mitiga-
tion  targets with the progress made, in order to 
assess whether mitigation targets have been 
achieved (Prag 2013). Accounting must there-
fore be discerned from the concept of report-
ing, which is related to the mere provision of 
data. Here, the information provided will not
necessarily be tallied against Parties’ NDCs 
(Hood et al 2014).
Corresponding adjustment will for instance 
have to applied if the transferring Party exports 
ITMOs that were generated within the scope of 
its NDC and the acquiring Party intends to use 
these ITMOs for NDC attainment. The details of 













Box 2: Emissions-based and target based accounting for ITMO transfers (Source: based on OECD and IEA 2017)
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to be agreed and be translated into concrete 
provisions, that will form part of the Paris rule 
book. In principle, however, two mathematical-
ly equivalent approaches can be distinguished:
Adjustments of emissions levels (emissions-
based accounting) and adjustment of target 
levels (target-based accounting) (see Box 2 be-
low). 
Accounting for transfers will neither be needed 
nor be possible in all cases and by all Parties in-
volved. If, for instance, ITMOs are generated 
outside the scope of an NDC, the transferring 
Party will not be able to account for these trans-
fers but it can only report on them.
The situation is similar if the acquiring country 
uses Article 6 in the context of (results-based) 
climate finance. Instead of using the ITMOs for 
compliance purposes by accounting these 
against its NDC, the acquiring country cancels 
the ITMOs without further adjusting its NDC or 
its reported emissions.
Hence, applicability of corresponding adjust-
ments will depend on where ITMOs have been
generated and how the acquiring Party intends 
to use them. If corresponding adjustments are 
not needed or possible, Parties could however 
be required to report on these transfers.
Emissions-based accounting starts from the Party’s inventory emissions (blue) which are then adjusted by adding or 
subtracting ITMOs (red) to reach an ITMO-adjusted emissions level (orange). This ITMO-adjusted emissions level can 
then be compared to the NDC target level in order to account for the Party’s progress in achieving its NDC. 
Target-based accounting starts from the NDC target level and adjusts it according to the ITMOs transferred. The 




















 Figure 3: Overview on ambition raising options. Source: Wuppertal Institute
Nicolas Kreibich 
3 Parties’ options to raise 
their ambition under Art. 6
This section will look at how market-based co-
operation activities under Article 6 of the Paris 
Agreement may contribute to the enhance-
ment of Parties’ ambition. In doing so, the pa-
per builds on the different types of market-
based cooperation outlined above.
A total of eight different ambition raising op-
tions were found. An overview is provided in
Figure 3 below. As you can see, the ambition 
raising options are associated to different phas-
es of the cooperation process: Ambition raising 
options 1 and 2 can be applied before the im-
plementation of the ITMO-generating has be-
gun. For the ambition raising options 3 and 4,
the mitigation activity must be implemented,
while the ITMO transfer as such must not yet 
have taken place. It should be noted, however,
that for robust accounting, information on the 
final use of the ITMOs by the acquiring Party 
will be needed for both of these options. Ambi-
tion raising options 5 and 6 are associated to 
the use of ITMOs. Options 7 and 8 are largely 
decoupled from the transfer process as such 
















Table 1: Compatibility of ambition raising options and different forms of market based cooperation. Source: Wuppertal
Institute
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As will be shown in much greater detail, ap-
plicability of these options also varies. While op-
tions 1, 2 and 8 can be used by all Parties, op-
tions 3, 4 and 7 can only be applied by trans-
ferring Parties. Options 5 and 6 are restricted to 
acquiring Parties. Furthermore, applicability of
ambition raising options varies among the dif-
ferent types of market-based cooperation pre-
sented in chapter 2.6. above. As can be seen 
from Table 1 most ambition raising options can 
be applied in numerous forms of cooperation.
Only options 2, 6 and 7 are restricted to specific 
forms of cooperation.
3.1 Raising ambition ex-ante 
When engaging in one of the forms of market-
based cooperation outlined above, transferring 
as well as acquiring Parties have different op-
tions to raise their climate change mitigation 
ambition. Parties have the possibility to indicate 
their willingness to raise their ambition before 
actually engaging in a specific form of Art. 6 co-
operation.
3.1.1 Ex-ante improvement of NDC 
A Party’s nationally determined contribution is
the key indicator of its ambition, making it a al-
so the primordial instrument for ambition rais-
ing. Hence, before engaging in cooperative ap-
proaches, Parties could indicate their willing-
ness to raise their ambition by modifying their 
NDC along two dimensions: The form (nature) 
and content (target level).
With regards to the very nature of the NDC, it 
must be noted that the UNFCCC could require 
countries willing to cooperate under Article 6 to 
adopt an NDC with specific characteristics, as 
this would contribute to safeguarding envi-
ronmental integrity and allow for robust ac-



















Eligibility of NDCs 
With the bottom-up approach the Paris Agreement 
has introduced, Parties are given significant leeway in 
defining their nationally determined contributions 
(NDCs). Parties to the agreement are making use of 
this new freedom, as the NDCs submitted up to date 
display a large diversity: while some Parties have 
submitted GHG emission targets, others have adopt-
ed non-GHG targets, combined their GHG emission 
target with non-GHG goals or pledged mere actions 
(policies and measures) to mitigate climate change. 
Diversity also exists among those countries that have 
submitted GHG emission targets: while some submit-
ted continuous multi-year targets that describe a re-
duction of GHG emissions over a period of time, oth-
ers submitted single-year targets, which only relate to 
a certain level of emissions in a specific year (for an 
overview see: IGES 2017; WRI 2017; Graichen, Cames, 
and Schneider 2016). This diversity does not only 
make it difficult to compare contributions and to as-
sess the individual as well as collective progress. The 
variety of NDCs also poses serious challenges in terms 
of accounting for ITMOs (Hood, Briner, and Rocha 
2014; Schneider et al. 2016). 
Restricting the access to Article 6 Parties with a specif-
ic type of NDC is being discussed as one possibility to 
ensure compatibility of NDCs and robust accounting 
(see inter alia: Schneider et al. 2016; Kreibich and 
Obergassel 2016).  Brazil, for instance, suggested to 
limit eligibility to Parties with quantified absolute re-
duction targets (Brazil 2017). In addition, requiring a 
minimum level of ambition and a sectoral scope has 
been suggested to avoid the generation of so-called 
hot air, the use of emission reductions from non-
additional mitigation activities (Schneider et al. 2017).
While restricting eligibility to Parties with absolute 
economy-wide emission targets would certainly re-
duce risks to environmental integrity, such require-
ments would at the same time conflict with the bot-
tom-up nature of the Paris Agreement. It remains to 
be seen whether Parties will find a common ground 
and approaches agreeable to all in order balance 
country ownership and broad participation with envi-
ronmental integrity of the Paris Agreement. 
Box 3: Eligibility of NDCs 
Parties could, however, go beyond these eligi-
bility requirements and adopt target types that 
are particularly clear and transparent. For in-
stance, Parties that have adopted a single-year 
target could move towards a multi-year target 
or develop multi-year trajectories (Lazarus et al. 
2014). Similarly, Parties could expand the sec-
toral scope of their targets and move from a 
single-sector target to an economy-wide target.
Moving from a simple to a more accurate NDC 
would allow for a more robust assessment of 
the Party’s mitigation activities and presumably
lead to an intensification of mitigation activities 
on the ground.
The main lever to increase ambition, however,
is the NDC’s target level: In order to demon-
strate their willingness to enhance ambition, 
Parties could adopt a target level that requires a 
significant intensification of mitigation actions.
3.1.2 Use efficiency gains from policy 
linking for ambition raising 
Linking emission trading schemes (ETS) is
commonly considered to yield significant gains.
In particular, linkage is associated with cost-
effectiveness, as the price-signal allows for the 
achievement of the lowest-cost emission reduc-
tions across the linked systems. A larger num-
ber of market participants may further result in 
a more liquid market as well as a reduced risk of 
carbon leakage. As highlighted by Metcalf and 
Weisbach (2010), linking does not have to be 
limited to ETSs and may also include taxes as 
well as regulatory policies allowing for different 
scenarios, including situations of mere policy 
coordination where units are not exchanged 
(for an overview on linking of different types of 
policies see: Haug, Frerk, and Santikarn 2015).
While the potential implications of linking non-
ETS policies under the Paris Agreement are still 
being explored (Bodansky et al. 2015; Kreibich 
and Wang-Helmreich 2017), the argument is 
repeatedly being made that linking policies in
general and ETS in particular will lead to effi-
ciency gains that result in an increase of ambi-
tion (recently: Keohane, Petsonk, and Hanafi
2017).
For the time being, however, these efficiency 
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means for ambition raising. Rather, the expecta-
tion was that Parties would take these cost re-
duction effects into account when defining 
their future mitigation targets. With the Paris 
Agreement requiring countries to raise their 
ambition and Article 6 potentially providing the 
basis for linking of ETS and other policies 
(Mehling, Metcalf, and Stavins 2017), there is
now the possibility to operationalize this linking
benefits. Parties could now use these efficiency 
gains to demonstrate their ambition raising ac-
tions, for instance by factoring in the additional
savings achieved through linking at the mo-
ment of adapting the design of their national
policies. This may result in a higher tax rate lev-
el or a lower ETS cap, which in turn would trans-
late into a more stringent NDC. 
3.2 Options during ITMO gener-
ation and transfer 
Possibilities to enhance Parties’ mitigation am-
bition are not limited to the situation before the 
cooperation under Article 6 begins, but Parties 
can also raise their ambition during and after 
the transfer of ITMOs. 
3.2.1 Use of MOs for overachievement 
of unconditional NDC or 
achievement of conditional NDC 
Whether the transferring Party will be able to 
use the emission reductions exported for ambi-
tion raising depends on how the acquiring 
country intends to use them and how they re-
late to the transferring Party’s NDC. For this op-
tion, the provisions of the Paris Agreement to 
avoid double counting (see Art. 6.2 and Art.
4.13) and paragraph 36 of the accompanying 
Decision on “corresponding adjustments” (para 
36 of the Decision 1/CP.21) can provide relevant 
insights. In line with the common reading of 
these provisions (see: Schneider et al. 2016; 
OECD and IEA 2017; Spalding-Fecher et al.
2017), the transferring country cannot use 
ITMOs for achieving its own NDC if these are 
used by the acquiring country for attaining its 
NDC. Instead, both countries will have to make 
“corresponding adjustments” to ensure that 
emission reductions aren’t claimed twice (see 
Box 2 above).
This implies that emission reductions that are 
used for NDC attainment by the acquiring Party 
cannot be used for ambition raising by the 
transferring Party. If, however, the acquiring 
Party does not use ITMOs neither for NDC at-
tainment nor for ambition raising, but as a 
means to disburse climate finance, the underly-
ing emission reductions could theoretically be 
used by the transferring country for ambition 
raising.
This option will be explored in greater detail by
looking at two cases which are very similar:
The first case is overachievement of an uncon-
ditional NDC. For this scenario, the author as-
sumes that a transferring Party has only adopt-
ed an unconditional NDC and implements 
mitigation activities in sectors covered by this 
unconditional NDC but not (yet) targeted by 
concrete mitigation measures. All else being 
equal, this mitigation activity would automati-
cally contribute to the achievement of the un-
conditional NDC. Hence, there is a large risk 
that the mitigation measure intended to con-
tribute to ambition raising will crowd-out other 
activities that would otherwise contribute to 
the achievement of the unconditional NDC.
Therefore, in order to actually raise its ambition,
the transferring country would have to avoid
such a crowding-out effect of domestic 
measures. In addition, the transferring Party 
could make corresponding adjustments that 
take into account the amount of ITMOs export-
ed even if they are not used by the acquiring 
country and would therefore not be necessary 
in terms of ensuring environmental integrity. 
Such an adjustment would, however, result in a 

























tries adjust their emissions beyond of what 
would formally be required to comply with the 
requirement of “corresponding adjustments” 
(see section 3.4.2 below).
The second case is achievement of conditional
NDC. For this scenario, it is assumed that the 
transferring Party has also adopted conditional
elements as part of its NDC (for an explanation 
of conditional and unconditional NDC see: Feh-
ler! Verweisquelle konnte nicht gefunden 
werden.). The author will in the following ex-
pect that this conditional target only differs 
from the unconditional one with regard to the 
level of the contribution, while the sectoral
scope, the reference level and all other parame-
ters of the NDC stay the same.  
In such a scenario, all mitigation activities im-
plemented within the scope of the NDC will 
contribute to both targets, the unconditional
and the conditional one. When implementing 
activities that result in ITMOs, however, the
transferring Party could decide whether the 
emission reductions generated are used for at-
taining to the unconditional or the conditional
NDC.
Only in the latter case, the emission reductions 
will contribute to the conditional part and can
therefore be considered ambition raising as 
they assist the country in moving beyond its 
unconditional target. The risks about the ITMO-
generating activity replacing domestic 
measures is the same as in the first case with 
the transferring Party overachieving its uncon-
ditional target. Furthermore, in both cases use 
of mitigation outcomes is only possible if the 
acquiring Party refrains from using the respec-
tive ITMOs.  
3.2.2 Use of MOs generated outside 
scope of NDC 
Using the cooperation mechanisms of Article 6 
to target emissions that are outside the NDC’s 
scope and which have previously not been 
tapped could be another possible way to in-
crease the transferring country’s mitigation 
ambition.
While the use of ITMOs from such emission 
sources for NDC attainment is problematic in
terms of environmental integrity (see Box 2) 
because there is no built-in incentive to ensure 
additionality, there is no integrity risk if ITMOs 
are being cancelled by the acquiring country 
and the transferring country uses Article 6 to 
raise its ambition.  
3.3 Options during ITMO use 
3.3.1 Use of ITMOs by the acquiring 
Party for ambition raising 
What are the options for the acquiring country 
to raise its ambition in this cooperation phase? 
Can the acquiring Party increase its mitigation 
ambition by cancelling the ITMOs imported? If 
the acquiring Party cancels ITMOs without ad-
justing its emissions downwards, a positive 
contribution to the climate would be achieved.
The question, however, is whether the reduc-
tions should be considered a  contribution to 
“overall mitigation in global emissions” or as an 
enhancement of the Party’s climate change mit-
igation ambition.
Building on the definition of ambition raising 
elaborated above, the cancellation of ITMOs by 
the acquiring Party is considered a raise of its 
mitigation ambition, as it is the Party itself who 
is responsible. From this point of view, this ac-
tion is comparable to a raise of climate finance 
ambition as there is no direct link to the actual 
mitigation action of the Party.
It should be noted, though, that cancelled 
ITMOs can only be used for ambition raising if
they are not at the same time used or claimed 
by the transferring country. In contrast, if ITMOs 
are cancelled (or discounted) by an overarching 
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emissions, mitigation ambition of Parties in-
volved would not be affected. 
3.3.2 “Insetting”: Linking use of ITMOs 
with domestic mitigation activi-
ties 
Offsetting was a key driver of the global carbon 
market under the Kyoto Protocol. Industrialized 
(Annex I) Parties with mitigation targets under 
the protocol made extensive use of this option 
to comply with their commitments. Under the 
Paris Agreement, market mechanisms are to go 
beyond offsetting, by also contributing to the 
enhancement of Parties’ ambition. One way to 
operationalize this could be “insetting”: Parties 
could still offset a share of their emission reduc-
tions but  the acquiring Party would commit to 
implement additional domestic mitigation ac-
tions when using the imported ITMOs for NDC 
attainment. The mitigation activities at home 
could be linked to the ITMO-generating activi-
ties abroad, for instance by applying the same
technology, by using a similar incentive struc-
ture or by simply linking the quantity of the 
GHG reductions achieved at home to a certain
share of the ITMOs imported.
3.4 Raising ambition ex-post 
3.4.1 Phasing-in new GHG sources and 
phasing-out climate finance 
This option could be applied in the context of 
policy crediting and also be relevant for activi-
ty-based crediting as well as sectoral crediting.
In a situation where the mitigation activity is 
implemented in sectors currently not covered 
by an NDC, the emission reductions generated 
by that activity would not assist the transferring 
Party in achieving its NDC. In order to raise its 
ambition, the transferring country could com-
mit to include the emissions targeted by the 
mitigation activity in its NDC at a later point in
time. This commitment could have very differ-
ent forms: it could be a mere political commit-
ment, be underpinned by national law or even 
be part of the purchase agreement with the ac-
quiring country, which makes payments for 
ITMOs contingent on addressing of these GHG 
sources by the national level.
In order to avoid a situation where emission 
sources are formally covered by the NDC but 
not targeted by policies, the GHG’s inclusion in
the transferring Party’s NDC could further be 
combined with a commitment by the transfer-
ring Party to continue implementing the credit-
ed policy once that the crediting period is over.
A similar structure is possible for mitigation ac-
tivities that are targeting emissions already 
covered by the current conditional NDC: The 
transferring country receives (results-based) 
payments for implementing mitigation activi-
ties that assist in achieving its conditional NDC.
This external support is then reduced in a dy-
namic way, requiring the transferring country 
to transition the conditional elements in its un-
conditional target.
The moment of inclusion could be linked to the 
five-year updating cycle of the NDC (see CCAP 
2017). Alternatively and given that Art. 4.11 of 
the Paris Agreement allows Parties to adjust 
their NDCs at any time, such an inclusion could 
also take place at a different (potentially earlier) 
point in time, for instance when the crediting 
period of the activity or policy ends. The out-
come of this process would be an NDC with ex-
panded sectoral scope.
3.4.2 Ex-post adjustment of emissions 
or NDC target level 
In order to show how their participation in Arti-
cle 6 cooperation increased their level of ambi-
tion, Parties could make adjustments of their 
NDC target level or their emissions after ITMO
transfers took place. Parties could in this case 








beyond of what would be required to account 
for the amount of ITMOs transferred. For in-
stance,  the transferring Party could adjust its 
current emissions level (or NDC target) beyond 
of what has been used by the acquiring Party 
for NDC achievement. The acquiring Party, by 
contrast, adjusts its NDC less than it could ac-
cording to the amount of ITMOs imported. The 
difference between the corresponding adjust-
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4 Assessment of options
In the following section, the options for ambi-
tion raising outlined above will be assessed
whether they could be applied by Parties under 
the UNFCCC. The assessment will be made 
along the following three dimensions: tech-
nical, political and institutional/legal.
Technical relates to the requirements in terms 
of data availability, methodological complexity 
of operationalisation at the different levels in-
volved.
Institutional relates to governance at the do-
mestic and the UNFCCC level: who could be 
tasked with the operationalisation of this op-
tion? Are there existing structures that could be 
used? 
Political/legal relates to the question of 
whether such an option is in line with the over-
arching legal framework of the UNFCCC and its 
Paris Agreement and whether given the exist-
ing realpolitics it seems plausible that political 
agreement to introduce such an option is at-
tainable. 
4.1 Assessment of ex-ante op-
tions 
4.1.1 Ex-ante improvement of NDC 
Transferring Parties and acquiring Parties could 
raise their ambition by improving their NDC in
form (i.e. moving from a single to a multi-year 
target) and content (adopting a more stringent 
target level). 
From a technical point of view, this option is
not very challenging. The Party could provide 
evidence on how the NDC was modified in
terms of parameters and target level. Technical 
reports and recent literature on accounting and 
transparency could be used as a basis to show 
that the changes made to the NDC parameters 
will actually provide more transparency and a 
more solid basis for (ITMO) accounting. Adop-
tion of a more stringent mitigation target is
technically easy, as long as the other NDC pa-
rameters remain unchanged. 
The institutional capacities required for this 
ambition raising option are limited, as it could 
build on structures that were used for the de-
velopment of the NDC. Hence, the institution 
that developed the NDC could be asked to 
identify ways to further improve its form and/or 
content. In doing so, this institution, which 
could for instance be a cross-sectoral body,
would have to take into account different is-
sues, such as data availability as well as mitiga-
tion potential and associated costs. While this 
would require institutional capacities, these 
would anyway be required for NDC develop-
ment.     
From a political and legal point of view, the op-
tion to improve the form of the NDC is fully in
line with the structure of the Paris Agreement:
Article 4.4, for instance, requires developed Par-
ties to adopt economy-wide mitigation targets 
and does also encourage developing countries 
to move to such targets over time. By the same
token, moving to a more stringent mitigation 
target is also what the Paris Agreement expects 
Parties to do. At the domestic level, however, 
such a move could raise significant political op-
position, in particular if countries that have a 
greater historic responsibility for human in-
duced climate change and which have higher 
capabilities to take action decide not to adjust 






















4.1.2 Use efficiency gains from policy 
linking for ambition raising 
Another ambition raising option is restricted to 
the policy linking scenario: Parties could com-
mit to use (part of) the efficiency gains from
linking their policies to enhance their climate 
change mitigation ambition.
This option is associated with significant tech-
nical challenges, as quantifying ex-ante the ef-
ficiency gains and cost-savings from linking two 
or more policies can be extremely difficult. In
the context of ETS linking, for instance, there 
are numerous factors that can influence the ac-
tual cost savings of linking, such as market size, 
pre-linking price levels, behaviour of market 
participants, etc.. In addition, administrative 
costs may significantly reduce the gains from 
linking and would have to be factored-in.
From an institutional point of view, linking of 
emission trading schemes or other policies will 
require the establishment of bi- or multilateral 
institutions. While these institutions could pro-
vide a good basis for administering this ambi-
tion raising option, additional capacities will be
required to assess and quantify the actual sav-
ings from linking and interpret these data.
Using the efficiency gains from linking for ambi-
tion raising is also associated with significant 
political challenges: Parties will have to agree 
on a common methodology to quantify cost-
savings. In addition, gains will most probably 
not be distributed evenly among the Parties in-
volved.
4.2 Assessment of options dur-
ing ITMO generation and 
transfer 
4.2.1 Use of MOs for overachievement 
of unconditional NDC or 
achievement of conditional NDC 
An ambition raising option limited to the trans-
ferring Party is to use the mitigation outcomes 
of an ITMO-generating activity that is imple-
mented within the scope of its NDC. If the trans-
ferring Party has adopted an unconditional
NDC only, the outcome will be an overa-
chievement of that NDC. If the unconditional
NDC was further combined with a conditional
one, the ambition raising option will contribute 
to the achievement of that conditional NDC. As 
outlined above, the use of mitigation outcomes 
by the transferring Party is only possible if the 
ITMOs are not used by the acquiring Party.  
This option is associated with significant tech-
nical challenges. The transferring Party will 
have to provide evidence that the mitigation 
outcomes do not contribute to the uncondi-
tional elements of the NDC and that the ITMO-
generating activity does not crowd-out other 
domestic mitigation activities. This requires suf-
ficient information on both, the conditional and 
unconditional elements and how both relate to 
the ITMO-generating activity.
The safest way to ensure this would be to use 
the mitigation outcomes only after the 
achievement of the unconditional target by
domestic measures has been shown. Hence, on-
ly after the end of the NDC’s timeframe. There-
fore, the option to use this ambition raising op-
tion would depend on the success of other 
domestic policies.
This raises significant challenges for some types 
of market-based cooperation under Article 6:
Policy crediting, for instance, would be chal-
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fer of ITMOs will not only depend on the per-
formance of the policy instrument that is being 
supported in the cooperation, but also on the 
performance of the transferring country’s na-
tional climate policy in general and its 
achievement of the conditional NDC. 
The institutional requirements for this ambi-
tion raising option, by contrast, are limited. The 
transferring country would simply have to indi-
cate that the (specific share of) mitigation out-
comes from the ITMO-generating activity will 
be used for ambition raising.
From a political/legal point of view, this ambi-
tion raising option is challenging as it requires 
the acquiring country to forego the use of 
ITMOs in favour of using the cooperation for 
climate financing. Hence, a clear agreement be-
tween the transferring and the acquiring Party 
on who will be allowed to use the mitigation
outcomes from the ITMO-generating activity is 
needed. Such an agreement will be challenged
by the risk that the ITMO-generating activity 
could ultimately only replace other mitigation 
activities intended for NDC achievement.  
4.2.2 Use of MOs generated outside 
scope of NDC 
Another option for transferring Parties is to use 
the mitigation outcomes that were generated 
outside the NDC’s scope for ambition raising.
This option might be associated with significant 
technical challenges. In order to clearly differ-
entiate the mitigation activity from the NDC, 
sufficient information on the NDC and the miti-
gation activity must be available. This might 
pose significant challenges of attribution. An-
other technical but also political challenge is
that, in order to actually be considered a con-
tribution to ambition raising, the transferring 
country will have to demonstrate that the activ-
ity would not have been implemented anyway,
that it is actually additional. The demonstration 
of additionality, however, is also associated 
with significant technical and also political chal-
lenges in terms of attribution and cause-effect 
relationships (for an in-depth review of addi-
tionality with respect to Art. 6 see: Hermwille 
and Obergassel 2018).
From an institutional perspective, use of inter-
national structures does not only seem advisa-
ble in terms of capacities and cost effectiveness. 
The fact that ITMOs generated outside the 
NDC’s scope cannot be accounted for and en-
suring the additionality of the underlying activi-
ty calls for strong international structures. Build-
ing such institutions from scratch in bilateral
mode and vesting them with strong authority 
does not seem viable. Therefore, this ambition 
raising option could be limited to activities im-
plemented under the new mechanism estab-
lished under Article 6.4.
Using emission reductions generated outside 
the NDC’s scope also raises serious politi-
cal/legal concerns: Transferring countries 
would be incentivized to maintain a small 
scope of their NDCs and continue receiving fi-
nancial support for the activities implemented 
beyond that scope. This is problematic in terms 
of accounting, as it makes it difficult to assess 
whether individual Parties and the global
community is on track in meeting the overarch-
ing Paris goals. More specifically, it is also not in
line with the requirement of Article 4.4 for de-
veloping countries to move towards economy-
wide emission targets.
4.3 Assessment of options dur-
ing ITMO use 
4.3.1 Use of ITMOs by the acquiring 
Party for ambition raising 
The use of ITMOs for ambition raising by the 























From a technical point of view, such an option 
should not pose any major obstacles. The ac-
quiring country would simply import the 
amount of ITMOs it intends to use for ambition 
raising and cancel these ITMOs without further 
adjusting its national emissions or its NDC level. 
Accounting would again take place at the in-
ternational level.  
In terms of institutional feasibility, this option
could be straightforward to implement, as it
could build on institutions that must be estab-
lished anyway for accounting of ITMOs. The 
amount of ITMOs Parties are using for NDC 
achievement and the amount of ITMOs export-
ed will be recorded by some institution. While it 
is still unclear whether such a institution would
be established in a centralised way at the inter-
national level or in a decentralised fashion at 
the Parties’ level, this institutional structure 
could be used for this ambition raising option 
by simply adding additional accounts for ambi-
tion raising.
Politically, this ambition raising option can be 
expected to be popularly received. It is linked to 
the concept of discounting which has been dis-
cussed for several years now in the context of 
new market mechanism (see inter alia: CDM
Policy Dialogue 2012; Lazarus, Erickson, Peter,
and Schneider 2013). In addition, several coun-
tries are already making experiences with the 
voluntary cancellation of units under the CDM
as a contribution to the global climate: By Sep-
tember 2017, 22,842,069 Certified Emission Re-
ductions (CERs) have been voluntarily cancelled 
(CDM EB 2017).
4.3.2 Insetting”: Linking use of ITMOs 
with domestic mitigation activi-
ties 
Another ambition raising option is what the au-
thor has termed “insetting”: Parties wanting to 
use imported ITMOs for NDC attainment com-
mit to implement additional domestic mitiga-
tion actions.
This ambition raising option is associated with 
some technical challenges. The link between 
the ITMOs and the additional domestic activity 
can be easily established. However, the acquir-
ing Party would further have to show that the 
domestic mitigation activity will actually con-
tribute to ambition raising: The activity would 
have to be additional and should not contrib-
ute to the unconditional NDC.
In institutional terms, this option requires the 
establishment of robust rules for the implemen-
tation of activities. Ideally, such rules would be 
established at the international level and appli-
cation be overseen by an independent body.
This is particularly relevant to prevent non-
additional activities being used for this option.
However, in particular with regard to activities 
under Article 6.2, Parties don’t seem to agree on 
the need to establish such an international
oversight body. Therefore, additional institu-
tions would be required to oversee and track 
the implementation of the policy in the acquir-
ing country.
From a legal/political point of view, the inset-
ting option can be considered to be challeng-
ing: On the one hand this ambition raising op-
tion seems to be fully compatible with well-
known principles, such as supplementarity. On 
the other hand, however, linking the transfer of 
ITMOs to the implementation (and success) of a 
domestic policy could raise significant opposi-
tion, including from the transferring Party. 
4.4 Assessment of ex-post opti-
ons 
4.4.1 Phasing-in new GHG sources and 
phasing-out climate finance 
Integrating new GHG sources into the transfer-
ring Party’s NDC after the end of the coopera-
tion with the acquiring Party is a promising ap-
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for sources that are not covered by the NDC at 
all and also for sources that are only part of the 
conditional NDC.
From a technical point of view, sufficient in-
formation on the NDC is required to clearly 
identify those GHG sources that are currently
not covered by the NDC. This includes infor-
mation on the unconditional and the condi-
tional elements of the NDC and how they relate 
to each other. Furthermore, it must be ensured 
that the emission reductions generated are tru-
ly additional, in order to be considered a con-
tribution to ambition raising at a later point in
time. Ensuring additionality, however, is associ-
ated with significant challenges, as it requires 
Parties to disentangle the causal relationship 
between the mitigation activity, the overarch-
ing policy intervention under which it is imple-
mented and the general conditions of imple-
mentation (see: Hermwille and Obergassel 
2018).
In institutional terms, different bodies would 
be involved depending on the phase of the co-
operation. In general terms, the implementa-
tion of cooperation activities will follow the 
provisions contained in the guidance for Article 
6.2 of the Paris Agreement (for an overview on 
Parties’ positions see Obergassel and Asche 
2017). Depending on the UNFCCC decisions re-
garding international guidance, installing addi-
tional bilateral bodies could be one way to en-
sure the integrity of the ITMOs resulting from
the cooperation activities. This is particularly 
important as there is no in-built incentive for 
transferring countries to ensure the integrity of 
the ITMOs generated outside the scope of their 
NDC. Once the GHG sources are covered by the 
NDC, the transparency framework for action of 
Article 13 of the Paris Agreement and its main 
procedure, the technical expert review, can be 
applied to track the progress of policies to-
wards NDC achievement.
From a political/legal point of view, the idea to 
target uncapped emissions seems largely 
agreeable, as it is well known from the Kyoto 
Protocol’s CDM. On the other hand, in particular 
developing countries might be hesitant to 
agree on transitioning additional GHG sources 
in their unconditional NDC and argue for the 
need of external support. With regards to the 
fulfilment of the Paris Agreement’s call to raise 
ambition, criticism could be raised regarding 
the fact that the actual enhancement of ambi-
tion will be made after the transfer took place. 
To counter such criticism, this ambition raising 
option could be combined with other short 
term ambition raising options. Another political
issue is the need for transparency and inde-
pendent oversight. While robust rules and in
particular the installation of independent over-
sight bodies could assist in ensuring compara-
bility of approaches applied, for instance for the 
demonstration of additionality, from a political
perspective countries will presumably not be 
able to agree on the installation of such bodies. 
4.4.2 Ex-post adjustment of emissions 
or NDC target level 
Parties participating in cooperative approaches 
under Article 6 could also make adjustments of 
their NDC target level or their emissions after 
ITMO transfers took place.
In technical terms, this option is easy to im-
plement. Parties would simply modify the 
amount of emissions they are to deduct or add 
to their accounts when implementing “corre-
sponding adjustments”.
The additional institutional capacities needed 
for this ambition raising option are limited: In
order to safeguard environmental integrity of 
the Paris Agreement and ensure Parties “apply 
robust accounting” (Art. 6.2, Paris Agreement) 
the CMA will have to agree on robust rules and 
an institutional ITMO accounting framework.
This ambition raising option could build on this
institutional structure by recording the “ambi-






addition to the accounting made in the context 
of ITMO use for NDC attainment.   
In political terms, the key challenge will be to 
agree on a procedure on how to take the ex-
post adjustment of emissions into considera-
tion if a Party participates in numerous cooper-
ation activities. In order to provide planning se-
curity for the (subnational) entities participating 
in such transfers, Parties could define ex-ante 















Table 2: Overview on ambition raising options’ assessment results 
Raising Ambition through Cooperation – Using Article 6 to bolster climate change mitigation 
5 Discussion 
The analysis has shown that the ambition rais-
ing options identified are associated with dif-
ferent technical, institutional and political chal-
lenges. In general, options that are limited to 
using a certain share of ITMOs for ambition rais-
ing (option 5), options that use accounting to 
over-adjust the emissions or target level (option 
8) or that lead to an ex-ante improvement of 
the NDC (option 1) are technically less complex 
and do also require limited additional institu-
tional capacities. By contrast, options that link 
the ITMO transfer to the implementation of 
domestic policies  (option 6) and that 
use the (expected) performance of 
the cooperation as a basis for decid-
ing on the level of the ambition rais-
ing (option 2) are particularly chal-
lenging. In general, using mitigation 
outcomes by the transferring Party,
either for overachieving the uncon-
ditional NDC or achieving condition-
al elements (option 3), are chal-
lenged by questions of relationship 
between NDC and activity and issues 
of additionality demonstration. Ta-
ble 2 provides an overview on the 
assessment results.  
With regard to the climate impact, 
an assessment of the individual op-
tions cannot be made as the final
impact will be highly dependent on
political decisions of the individual
countries. Hence, for instance, while 
ex-ante improvements of NDCs 
might generally yield large climate 
benefits, the final impact in the ap-
plication of this option will depend
on the respective government and 
its willingness to actually make sub-
modifications of the NDC.
Furthermore, the possibility to implement the 
ambition raising options will depend on the 
type of cooperation the respective Party is en-
gaging in as well as on other factors, such as da-
ta availability, institutional capacities or the po-
litical economy in the respective country.
Therefore, a top-down decision by the UNFCCC 
that requires individual Parties to use a specific
ambition raising option doesn’t seem advisable.
A menu-approach, which allows Parties to 
 
















choose the ambition raising form that best suits 
its national circumstances and the specific type 
of cooperation it is engaging in seems much 
more advisable. Such an approach is also much 
more compatible with the general bottom-up 
structure of the Paris Agreement. 
This does by no means mean that the interna-
tional level cannot exert any influence on the 
choices available: Policy makers could require 
Parties to combine options that, taken together,
lead to the desired short-term as well as long-
term impact: For instance, a transferring Party 
could decide to use the mitigation outcomes to 
overachieve its current unconditional NDC (op-
tion 3) thereby achieving a short-term climate 
benefit while at the same time committing to 
phase-out climate finance for this type of GHG 
sources (option 7) in order to achieve a long-
term climate benefit. 
Integrating such a menu approach into the 
NDC cycle as the Paris Agreement’s overarching 
framework for ambition raising looks particular-
ly promising:
Under the transparency framework (Art. 13) 
Parties would be required to provide evidence 
about the use of market mechanism and which 
ambition raising options they intend to apply,
including information about the expected cli-
mate impact. This initial choice of the ambition 
raising options would then undergo a technical
expert review following the general provisions 
included in Art. 13.11. The review team would 
then assess this choice by taking into account 
the national conditions, such as data availability 
and local institutional capacities, and potential-
ly identify areas of improvement.  
In line with the timing of the NDC updating cy-
cle, Parties could be required to provide data on 
the impact of the ambition raising options that 
were applied during the five-year NDC cycle 
and how the raise in ambition was taken into 
account when updating the NDC. Collective da-
ta and experiences could then also inform the 
global stocktake process.
Furthermore, the committee established under 
Art. 15 could inform Parties about whether the 
choice of the ambition raising options and their 
application is in line with the provisions of the 
Paris Agreement. 
By embedding the menu approach into the 
overarching reporting and monitoring process-
es of the Paris Agreement, Parties’ ambition 
raising choices, the impact of the individual ap-
plication of options could be made transparent 
and ensures it is part of the public scrutiny pro-
cess. 
At a subordinate level, single institutions and 
processes of the transparency framework and 
the updating cycle will perform key tasks dur-
ing the application of ambition raising options.
Furthermore, Article 6 specific processes and 
respective institutions will perform specific 
tasks, such as the oversight on ITMO transfers 
and robust accounting.
However, a strong coordination would be re-
quired between the institutions established at 
the highest level, those responsible for Article 
6-specific tasks and institutions potentially es-






  Table 3: Ambition raising options: compatibility and assessment results. Source: Wuppertal Institute
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6 Conclusions
This policy paper assessed how market-based 
mechanisms can contribute to enhancing Par-
ties’ climate change mitigation ambition. The 
author started off with a clarification of the 
concepts of ambition and ambition raising by 
taking a closer look at how these concepts are 
being used in the Paris Agreement. From this 
exercise, a preliminary definition of ambition 
raising was elaborated which denotes the in-
tensification of climate change mitigation tar-
gets and actions by Parties.
This conceptual clarification allowed to clearly 
delimit ambition raising from other related 
concepts such as “contribution to overall miti-
gation”. Here, actorness served as a distinctive 
feature: While the enhancement of ambition 
requires some actor (the Party), no such actor-
ness is required to achieve a contribution to 
overall mitigation. 
Building on this preliminary conceptual work, 
the paper looked into the variety of market-
based cooperation under Article 6 to identify 
different forms of how Parties engaging in such 
forms of cooperation could raise their climate 
change mitigation ambition. In total, nine dif-
ferent ambition raising options were identified.
Applicability of these options varies: While 

















based cooperation others are limited to the role
of the transferring Party in one specific type of 
cooperation.
The subsequent section assessed the ambition 
raising options identified and found that the 
options vary significantly in terms of the tech-
nical, institutional and legal/political require-
ments: While some options do merely require a 
political decision to be taken and result in a 
simple deduction of emission reduction from a 
previous level, others require the assessment of 
complex interactions of domestic policy per-
formance, the assessment of additionality of ac-
tivities and other technical as well as political 
challenges. 
As can be seen from Table 3, ambition raising 
option 1 - ex-ante improvement of NDC - is not 
only associated with low technical, institutional 
and legal/political barriers but does also display 
high compatibility, as it can be implemented by
the transferring and the acquiring Parties alike.
Option 5, the use of ITMOs by the acquiring Par-
ty for ambition raising, was also assessed as be-
ing rather simple to implement. This option,
however, is restricted to the acquiring Party. 
Another option with high compatibility and on-
ly limited requirements is option 8, the ex-post 
adjustment of emissions or NDC target level 
through accounting. Other options, in particu-
lar those linked to the (expected) performance 
of the cooperation (option 2) and those raising 
issues of additionality (options 3 and 4) are 
more challenging to implement.
In light of the diversity of ambition raising ap-
proaches and taking into consideration the di-
versity of Parties’ domestic capacities as well as 
the bottom-up approach on which the Paris 
Agreement is build, the author holds that a 
menu approach that allows Parties to choose 
the ambition raising option that best suits its 
domestic situation is the most promising ap-
proach for inducing a ambition raising momen-
tum. Such an approach would not only be in
line with the spirit of Paris but further allow to
integrate the application of the ambition rais-
ing options identified into the NDC cycle of the 
Paris Agreement and its institutional processes,
such as the transparency framework, the global
stocktake and the compliance mechanism. The 
integration into this institutional framework 
and its processes could also serve as a safe-
guard against lack of ambition.  
In order to ensure that the ambition raising re-
quirement of Article 6.1 will have the highest 
possible impact, the CMA should carefully fine-
tune the ambition raising requirements linked 
to the use of market-based mechanisms: By re-
quiring Parties to combine ambition raising op-
tions with a immediate (short-term) impact 
with dynamic (long-term) ambition raising op-
tions the overall ambition raising impact of Ar-
ticle 6 activities could be maximised while at 
the same time allowing countries to choose the 
combination of ambition raising options that 
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